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In Bell inequality tests, the evolution of the wavefunction is not covariant, i.e. not invariant under
velocity boost that change the time ordering of events, but the laws that govern the probability
distribution of possible results are. In this note I investigate what this could mean and whether
there could be some covariant ”real quantum stuff”. This clarifies the implication of the Free Will
Theorem and of relativistic spontaneous localization models based on the flash ontology (rGRWf).
Some implications for the concept of time(s) are spelled out.
PACS numbers:
The Free Will Theorem[1] has attracted quite a lot
of attention. This is due in part to provocative termi-
nology, but also to the claim that no deterministic nor
stochastic dynamics could ever be compatible with highly
plausible assumptions. Without going into (important)
details, it will suffice here to recall that the authors of
the Free Will Theorem assume the possibility for exper-
imentalists to freely (independently) chose measurement
settings and that quantum theory and (special) relativity
make correct predictions in already well tested situations,
including the violation of Bell’s inequality. For determin-
istic dynamics, this is not new and won’t interest us in
this note. But for stochastic dynamics the situation is
interesting. Indeed, the claim in [1] contradicts the ex-
plicit model presented by Tumulka in [2]. The aim of this
note is to pin down that the origin of the confusion [3]
lies in very different understanding of what a ”covariant
quantum process” is; we shall see that, in some sense,
both [1] and [2] are correct.
Quantum measurements applied to systems composed
of several distant subsystems, as those used in Bell in-
equality tests, are at odds with special relativity. In-
deed, quantum measurements ”collapse” the wavefunc-
tion of the system in a non-covariant way. This is true
even if one doesn’t strictly apply the projection postu-
late, as long as one admits that (at least some) measure-
ments have definite classical results secured in a finite
time. Consequently, the usual wavefunction (or equiva-
lently the state vector) is not a covariant object. This
led many authors to conclude that only the probabilities
that appear in quantum physics can be described in a
covariant way, not the state (see e.g. [4]).
But, what could this seemingly well accepted ”way
around the quantum-relativity tension” mean? Should
one conclude that the real stuff in quantum physics is
not the state, but the probabilities? Or in more dra-
matic words, that the real stuff are the probabilities, not
the probability amplitudes? In this little note I would
like to plunge into quantum ontology and ask what is the
real stuff in quantum physics and what are these covari-
ant quantum probabilities.
Let me start my investigation with the standard ex-
ample of two qubits, e.g. two 2-level atoms, located at
a large distance from each other (large enough that one
can easily perform space-like separated measurements on
them). First, let’s look at the situation from a reference
frame in which Alice, who controls the first qubit, per-
forms her measurement first, see Fig. 1. The probability
of her outcome can easily be computed and the process
simulated on a classical computer. For the purpose of
such a simulation one needs a random number genera-
tor; one may use a quantum random number generator,
but this is not necessary. Actually, one could merely
fetch some number from a file that contains random num-
bers produced and saved to a hard disk a long time ago.
Hence, Alice’s probabilities can be thought of and simu-
lated as if they were mere epistemic probabilities, that is
as if the actual results were determined by some classi-
cal variable (the numbers stored on the computer’s hard
disk). Let me emphasize that all classical probabilities
can be thought of and simulated in such a way. Denoting
λ the classical variables stored on the hard disk, Alice’s
result α is a function of her measurement settings ~a and of
λ: α = FAB(~a, λ), where FAB reminds us that this is the
”first measurement” in the time order A-B. Next, con-
sider Bob’s measurement, in the same reference frame.
His result β is also probabilistic, but, since he is sec-
ond to measure, his result may depends also on Alice’s
measurement setting and outcome. In order to simulate
Bob’s outcome one may use the same random number
fetched from the hard disk: β = SAB(~a,~b, λ), where SAB
stands for ”second”. Note that one could think of λ as
a nonlocal variable [5], but I am more thinking of it as a
variable used to simulate such experiments on one (local)
classical computer.
That the above sketched simulation works, i.e. repro-
duced all probabilities and correlations of real experi-
ments, should be clear. Indeed, this is standard quantum
mechanics and, again, this is how any stochastic process
can be simulated. But now, let’s look at the experiment
from another reference frame, one in which Bob is first
and Alice second, see Fig. 1. By symmetry it is clear that
this situation can equally be simulated: β = FBA(~b, λ)
and α = SBA(~b,~a, λ) with possibly different functions
FBA 6= FAB , SBA 6= SAB . Note that the same file of λ’s
can be used to equally well simulate both cases, the one
in which Alice is first and the one in which she is second.
The variable λ is arbitrarily large and the functions FAB
and FBA may access different parts of λ.
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FIG. 1: Standard configuration for tests of Bell inequality as
seen from two different reference frames. In the first frame,
Alice performs her measurement before Bob and her result is
determined by the function FAB; in the other frame she is sec-
ond and her result is given by the function SBA, as explained
in the text.
But now, if the probabilities are the real stuff, as
hypothesized above, then there should be a file of ap-
propriate λ’s, that is, of random variables of the ap-
propriate size and structure, and 4 different functions
FAB , FBA, SAB , SBA such that the results don’t depend
on the reference frame, i.e. don’t depend on the chronol-
ogy, or, in other words, such that, loosely speaking, the
”probabilities are covariant”:
α = FAB(~a, λ) = SBA(~b,~a, λ) (1)
β = SAB(~a,~b, λ) = FBA(~b, λ) (2)
for all ~a,~b, λ. But no functions FAB , SAB , FBA, SBA sat-
isfying (1) and (2) exists. Indeed, (2) implies that SAB is
independent of ~a which would turn λ into a local variable.
And it is well known that local variables can’t simulate all
quantum correlations, in particular can’t simulate those
violating Bell’s inequality.
Accordingly, not only can the quantum state not be
described in a covariant way, but neither can the proba-
bilities. So, what remains?
Here one needs to be more careful and precise with
what one means by ”covariant probabilities”: one
should distinguish probability distributions from their
realizations. Intuitively, a probability distribution is
like a cloud of potential events that may occur with some
probabilities (e.g. they have an intrinsic propensity to re-
alize themselves), while a realization is a single event that
happens to became actual. This is illustrated in Fig. 2
where the star near the center distinguishes the actual
event among the cloud of possibilities.
Accordingly, the probability distributions remain co-
variant (the sets of possible outcomes is covariant), but
not their realizations. If one looks at the same exper-
iment from two different reference frames, one can as-
sign compatible probability distributions (this is what
FIG. 2: A cloud of possible future events, as in standard in-
terferometric experiments. The cloud suggests a probability
distribution. The star near the center highlights the event that
actually happened in the experiment. The cloud of potential
events is covariant, but the actual event is not.
standard quantum physics does), but there is no way to
assign unique realizations of these probability distribu-
tions. The consequence is that one should not think of
these probabilities as usual; in particular one can’t simu-
late these probabilities on a classical computer, or, more
precisely, if one simulates them, the simulation can be
faithful only for a given chronology.
So, what, then, is real? The probability distribu-
tions or the actual realizations? The probability dis-
tributions are covariant, but don’t describe the actual
world. The realizations describe the world we see around
us, but, necessarily, in a non-covariant way. In short:
Only the cloud of potentialities is covariant, the actual
events aren’t. Hence, in some sense, the open future is
covariant, but the past is not.
Note the implication for the concept of time. Quantum
events are not mere functions of variables in space-time,
but true creations: time does not merely unfold, true
becoming is at work. The accumulation of creative events
is the fabric of time [6].
But does all this have any practical implications? Yes,
of course. Let’s come back to the Free Will Theorem
(FWT) and to Tumulka’s relativistic stochastic sponta-
neous localization model. In [1] the authors of the FWT
correctly recall that the free choice of settings in a Bell
inequality test, the violation of the inequality and rela-
tivistic time-order invariance are incompatible with any
deterministic evolution of the quantum stuff (quantum
state, quantum particle, name it as you like). But then,
the authors claim that their result extends straightfor-
wardly to the non-deterministic case, arguing that ”it
will plainly make no difference to let them (the random
numbers λ) be given in advance”[1]. As we have seen in
this note, this claim is correct if one insists that the real-
izations should be time-order invariant, but not if one is
satisfied with time-order invariant (i.e. covariant) prob-
ability distributions. Hence, the FWT states that the
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quantum events are not functions of space-time, a re-
sult one can find under many different forms in the lit-
erature, and, more interestingly, states as a consequence
that the quantum events must enjoy some sort of ”free-
dom”, i.e. in my words correspond to true becoming. Let
me add that, although the FWT isn’t really new and the
proof given unnecessarily complicated, I am very sympa-
thetic with the spirit of the FWT: quantum events are
not merely the realization of usual probability distribu-
tions, but must be thought of as true acts of creations
(true becoming).
Let me turn to Tumulka’s nice model and to the con-
troversy he and co-workers raised against the FWT. He
named his model rGWRf for ”relativistic GRW model
with the flash ontology” [2]. In this model, the quan-
tum stuff are the locations of the spontaneous localiza-
tion (GRW hits), that he calls flashes. The probability
distributions of possible future flashes is time-order in-
variant, i.e. covariant. But the set of actual past flashes
are not (and couldn’t be). Hence, the rGRWf model is
as covariant as possible: the laws governing rGRWf are
covariant. By abandoning the usual wavefunction on-
tology for the flash ontology, Tumulka gave us the best
model we have today [7]. Tumulka and co-authors cor-
rectly insist that rGRWf is as covariant as possible, and
the FWT correctly stresses that it is not more covariant
than possible, as this little note hopefully clarifies.
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